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Case Update: German CompuServe
Director Acquitted on Appeal
BY LOTHAR DETERMANN*
This case note follows up on a previous article published in this
law review about the managing director of the German CompuServe
subsidiary, Mr. Felix Somm, who was indicted in 1996 and sentenced
to two years imprisonment on probation in May 1998 by a judge in
Munich! In December 1999, the Munich court of appeals overruled
the decision of the lower court and acquitted Mr. Somm.2
I. Crime and Punishment
The 1998 decision of the Munich court of first instance3 is
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1. Lothar Determann, The New German Internet Law, 22 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMp. L. REV. 113, 119 (1998).
2. LG Miinchen, NJW, 53 (2000), 1051 (with a case note by Hans-Heiner Kiihne
at 1003), CR, 20 (2000), 118 (with a case note by Hans-Werner Moritz at 119) (LG
Miinchen Az. 20 Ns 465 Js 173158/95 (Dec. 28,1999)) [hereinafter Appeal Case].
3. AG Mtinchen, NJW, 51 (1998), 2836 (with a case note by Thomas Hoeren at
2792), CR 18 (1998), 500 (with a case note by Hans-Werner Moritz), MMR 1 (1998),
429 (with case note by Ulrich Sieber) (Az. 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95 (May 28, 1998))
[hereinafter Lower Court Case]. For additional information on the case, see Eric
Berlin, CompuServe Bows to Germany, INTERNET WORLD (Apr. 1996)
<http:llwww.internetworld.comlprint/monthly/1996/04/news.html>; Ulrich Sieber,
Strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fuer den Datenverkehr in Internationalen
Computernetzen [Criminal Liability for Data Transfer in International Computer
Networks], JURISTEN ZEITUNG 429 (1996) [hereinafter Sieber, Criminal Liability];
Ulrich Sieber, Kontrollmoglichkeiten zur Verhinderung Rechtswidriger Inhalte in
Computernetzen, Zur Umsetzung von § 5 TDG am Beispiel der Newsgroups des
Internet [Possibility of Preventing Illegal Content in Computer Networks, For Example
Newsgroups on the Internet, Implementation of §5 TDG], CR 17, (1997), 581 (653);
Ulrich Sieber Computerkriminalitdit und Informationsstrafrecht, Entwicklungen in der
Internationalen Informations - und Risikogesellschaft [Computer Criminality and
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currently available in English on the Internet.4 Between 1995 and
1996, CompuServe Deutschland GmbH was a wholly owned
subsidiary of CompuServe, Inc., a U.S. corporation. In 1995,
CompuServe Deutschland GmbH had approximately 170 employees
and was engaged in marketing, sales, customer service and technical
support for its U.S. parent company in connection with the Internet
services provided by CompuServe, Inc. CompuServe Deutschland
GmbH participated in the distribution of content from U.S. servers to
German Internet users by maintaining a dedicated telephone line
between the servers of its parent company and Internet gateways in
Germany. The German Internet users did not contract with
CompuServe Deutschland GmbH, but rather directly with
CompuServe, Inc., which offered, among other things, access to
content on its servers. CompuServe, Inc. based and operated its
servers in the United States. These servers contained content such as
newsgroups with articles published by U.S. Internet users (content
providers) and video games published by CompuServe, Inc.
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In December 1995, Munich law enforcement officials provided
Information Society, Developments in the International Information and Risk Society],
CR (1995), 100.
4. See German CompuServe Judgment Available On-Line, (visited Sept. 5, 2000)
<http://www.qlinks.net/comdocs/somm.htm> (unofficial translation); Cyber-Rights &
Cyber-Liberties, Felix Somm Decision in English, (visited Sept. 5, 2000)
<http://www.cyber-rights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm>.
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CompuServe Deutschland GmbH with a list of 282 newsgroups
emanating from CompuServe, Inc.'s servers, each of which contained
child pornography and extreme violence. The Munich District
Attorney notified CompuServe Deutschland GmbH that these
contents were illegal, indicated the possibility of criminal sanctions,
and asked it to prevent further distribution., The director of the
German subsidiary, Felix Somm, informed CompuServe, Inc. of the
official request. CompuServe, Inc. blocked the 282 newsgroups
shortly thereafter to avoid sanctions against its subsidiary.
This block caused an uproar in the Internet community-
especially in the United States-that impaired CompuServe's
worldwide business.5 Therefore, in February 1996, CompuServe, Inc.
again made the newsgroups in question accessible to Internet users
worldwide, including German Internet users by necessity. The
German subsidiary informed the Munich District Attorney that it
deemed further blocking unnecessary because CompuServe
Deutschland GmbH now offered a free filter program named "Cyber
Patrol" to its customers. The company argued it had therefore taken
all reasonable and acceptable steps to prevent minors from accessing
illegal content. The District Attorney disagreed because distribution
to adults of violent pornography and child pornography also violates
German criminal laws (as well as some U.S. criminal laws). Although
German law professors6 and politicians strongly criticized the
proceedings of the Munich prosecutors, the prosecutors formally filed
a bill of indictment against Mr. Somm in 1996.
On May 28, 1998, the Munich criminal court of first instance
sentenced Mr. Somm, who had no previous police record, to two
years' probation This decision surprised many, including the
Munich District Attorney, who had requested an acquittal of Mr.
Somm after Germany enacted specific Internet laws in 1997. These
laws applied retroactively and exempted Mr. Somm from criminal
liability.8 Nevertheless, the Munich judge held that Mr. Somm was
5. See Berlin, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Sieber, Criminal Liability, supra note 3; Eric Hilgendorf,
3berlegungen Zur Strafrechtlichen Interpretation des Ubiquitaetsprinzips im Zeitalter
des Internet [Considerations Regarding the Criminal Law Interpretation of the
Principle of Ubiquity in the Age of the Internet], 1997 N.J.W. 1873,1874 (1997).
7. Lower Court Case, supra note 3; see also Mary Lisbeth D'Amico, Germany
Troubled by CompuServe Porn Conviction, INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 29,1998.
8. See LOTHAR DETERMANN, KOMMUNIKATIONSFREIHEIT IM INTERNET
[FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATIONS ON THE INTERNET] 575-92 (1999) (English summary
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guilty of thirteen counts of violating section 184 III of the German
Penal Code (StGB)9 by intentionally distributing child, animal and
extremely violent pornography, and that he negligently violated
Section 21 III of the German Code on Youth Protection (GjS) 0 by
making video games rated PG-18 available to minors.
Throughout 1996, newsgroup articles containing pictures of
children, animal and extremely violent pornography (as described in
detail in the Munich court decision)' continued to be available on
servers operated by CompuServe, Inc. These materials were
accessible to Internet users worldwide. German Internet users could
gain access to these materials via the dedicated telephone line and
gateways operated by CompuServe Deutschland GmbH. Through
the same connection, German customers of CompuServe, Inc. also
continued to have access to extremely violent video games that had
been rated PG-18 by the competent German agency.
2
There is little doubt that the contents in question did indeed
qualify as illegal materials under German and United States criminal
law and that the defendant helped distribute them. Without the
specific limitations provided by the 1997 German Internet laws, a
conviction might arguably have been justified, although German
criminal law scholars came to the contrary conclusion in articles
published during the 1996 proceedings and shortly after the 1998
judgment.3 Under the specific German Internet laws, however, Mr.
Somm was clearly exempt from criminal liability, which even the
District Attorney conceded in his 1997 request for an acquittal.
H. The Acquittal
The Munich court of appeals also found that Mr. Somm was
exempt from liability under the 1997 German Internet laws and also
on 617, 623). An English translation is available at
<http://www.usfca.edu/ipla/determann-article.htm>]; see generally NORBERT WIMMER
& GERHARD MICHEAL, DER ONLINE-PROVIDER IM NEUEN MULTIMEDIARECHT [THE
ONLINE PROVIDER UNDER NEW MULTI MEDIA LAW] (1998).
9. § 184 III StGB, v. 26.1.1998 (BGBl. I S.1607).
10. Gesetz ueber die Verbreitung jugendgefahrdender Schriften [GjS] [Law
Against the Distribution of Materials Endangering Minors], v. 28.10.1998 (BGBI. I
S.3186).
11. Lower Court Case, supra note 3, at 22-27.
12. The Bundesprifstelle zum Schutz vor Jugendgefiihrdenden Schriften [Federal
Censorship Commission for Materials Endangering Minors] publishes a list of
materials that may not be made accessible to minors. See § 1 GjS.
13. See, e.g., Sieber, Criminal Liability, supra note 3.
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that Mr. Somm's contributions to the publication of the illegal
content were not even actionable under traditional German criminal
laws.14
1. Traditional German Criminal Laws
Mr. Somm did not qualify as an accomplice, principal in the
second degree, or accessory to the crimes because he lacked specific
control over the publications. Customers of CompuServe, Inc. posted
the illegal materials on CompuServe, Inc.'s servers. These private
individuals acted as principals in the first degree. CompuServe, Inc.
was technically able to block or remove these postings once it
discovered their nature. Therefore, one could argue that
CompuServe, Inc. aided these principals and thus qualified as an
accomplice or principal in the second degree. However, CompuServe
Deutschland GmbH, managed by Mr. Somm, was physically unable
to block or remove specific postings from its parent company's
servers. As managing director, Mr. Somm basically had only one
possibility to influence the dissemination of the illegal content
through the Internet connection maintained by CompuServe
Deutschland GmbH: he could have ordered the employees of
CompuServe Deutschland GmbH to block the entire link between
the German Internet users and CompuServe, Inc.'s servers.
Obviously, this would likely have resulted in his immediate removal
as managing director of CompuServe Deutschland GmbH by its sole
shareholder, CompuServe, Inc. Even if Mr. Somm had taken this
drastic action, the illegal postings on CompuServe, Inc.'s servers
would still have remained accessible to German Internet users via
connections provided by other Internet hosting service providers,
including CompuServe's competitors and, most notably, the Bavarian
government. In light of these factual and legal circumstances, the
Munich court of appeals held that Mr. Somm's actions or omissions
did not legally qualify as a significant aid to the distribution of the
illegal content. Consequently, Mr. Somm did not commit an actus
reus, the first basic element of any crime.
In addition, the Munich court of appeals held that Mr. Somm
lacked the mens rea required by the applicable German criminal
15statutes. All but one charge required that Mr. Somm have acted, orhave failed to act, with at least general intent. In this regard, the
14. Appeal Case, supra note 2, at 29-30.
15. Id. at 30, 32.
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court of appeals stressed that Mr. Somm continuously urged
CompuServe, Inc. to block or remove the illegal postings from its
servers. However, in this, the court of appeals went too far. Under
general principles of criminal law a personal preference to avoid the
illegal results of an action or omission does not negate general intent.
General intent only requires that the defendant act with the
knowledge that his actions or omissions will cause the illegal results
that constitute an element of the crime, regardless of whether the
defendant welcomes or fears such results. When informed by the
prosecutors that the illegal postings existed, Mr. Somm had such
knowledge. Therefore, he acted intentionally when he failed to block
the connection to CompuServe, Inc.'s servers. Mr. Somm did not lack
mens rea.
This is even clearer with regard to the charge of negligent failure
to prevent access of minors to violent computer games. When the
Munich court of appeals stressed that Mr. Somm could not be
required to permanently check the nature of more than one thousand
computer games available on CompuServe, Inc.'s servers, 6 the court
overlooked the fact that Mr. Somm was only indicted for not
preventing access to certain games that were specifically listed and
described by the Munich district attorneys in their written notice to
CompuServe Deutschland GmbH. Furthermore, Mr. Somm
intentionally refrained from blocking access to CompuServe, Inc.'s
servers altogether.
Therefore, while the Munich court of appeals correctly negated
an actus reus, it had no grounds to negate the respective mens rea.
2. The 1997 German Internet Laws
Even assuming that an actus reus occurred and mens rea existed,
Mr. Somm was exempt from criminal liability under the 1997 German
Internet laws. 7 These laws divide the roles of the players on the
Internet into five categories: content providers, access providers and
hosting service providers (collectively referred to as online
providers), telecommunications carriers and users.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 31.
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Figure 2.
a. Content, Access and Hosting Service Providers
Content providers and users are the cyberspace equivalents of
traditional speakers and the audience." The content provider selects
and publishes information that is made available to the user. The
content provider uses the computer (server), online connections and
software of a hosting service provider to publish this information on
18. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, Reno v.
ACLU, 117 Sup. Ct. 2329 (1997); see also Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 47
U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1996) (defining "Information Content Provider").
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the Internet. The access provider grants users access to the Internet
and often provides software, online connections and e-mail accounts
on its server. That way the user can receive and access content
disseminated through, or published on, the Internet. The
telecommunications lines that link all servers together and connect
the computers of the content providers and users to the Internet are
provided and maintained by telecommunications carriers, i.e.,
telephone companies and television cable operators.
In this role, telecommunications carriers fulfill similar functions
to their traditional telephone business, and it is not apparent why the
rules regarding their liabilities and responsibilities as applied to
Internet communications should be treated differently. As the
carriers are usually unable to execute any control over the contents
transmitted, they normally are neither liable nor responsible for their
customers' communications." There is also no apparent reason why
content providers and users should be treated differently from off-
line speakers and audiences. Before the 1997 German Internet laws
were enacted it was questionable, however, to what extent, if any,
classic media roles, such as editors, news agents or telephone
companies," are comparable to access and hosting service providers.
For purposes of clarification, the 1997 German Internet laws provide
specific rules in this area that are somewhat similar to the rules set
forth in the U.S. Communications Decency Act,21 and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.'
In Mr. Somm's case, U.S. customers of CompuServe, Inc. posted
materials on CompuServe, Inc.'s servers. In this role, CompuServe,
Inc. acted as a hosting service provider for its customers, the content
providers. CompuServe Deutschland GmbH was not involved at all
19. See Ruth Hill Bro, Defamation Online, in ONLINE LAW: THE SPA'S LEGAL
GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 429, 441 (Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed.,
1996).
20. See generally R. Hayes Johnson, Jr., Note, Defamation in Cyberspace: A
Court Takes a Wrong Turn on the Information Superhighway in Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 49 ARK. L. REV. 589 (1996); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 805178, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995), 24 MEDIA L.
REP. 1126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); AG Berlin, CR 18 (1998), 111 (260-DS 857/96 (June
30, 1997)).
21. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223-230 (1996); see generally
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2347-48 n.45 (1997); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916,
941 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Carl Benson et al., Computer Crimes, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
409,421 (1998).
22. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
[Vol. 23:109
1999] Case Update: German CompuServe Director Acquitted on Appeal 117
in this relationship and therefore did not qualify as a hosting service
provider. CompuServe, Inc. also made the materials posted by its
U.S. customers available to German Internet users. In this context,
CompuServe, Inc. acted as an Internet access provider. CompuServe
Deutschland GmbH supported CompuServe, Inc. as an access
provider by providing technical support and maintaining a dedicated
telephone line. Therefore, CompuServe Deutschland GmbH
qualified only as an Internet access provider.'
b. Liability of Internet Hosting Service Providers
Under the 1997 German Internet laws, a hosting service provider
such as CompuServe, Inc. is only liable for illegal content that it
channels onto the Internet if (1) it is actually aware of the substance
of the illegal content, and (2) if it is technically possible and
reasonably acceptable for the hosting service provider to prevent the
publication or distribution of the unlawful content on the Internet.
The statute does not define the term "acceptable." This term
appears in many other German statutes, however, and it is generally
interpreted to necessitate a balancing of conflicting interests. 4 When
proposing the 1997 draft legislation,' the German federal government
explicitly suggested such an interpretation of the term "acceptable."
26
According to the German federal government, the balancing decision
should consider the relevance of the incident, the costs of blocking a
single file, and the impact for other parts of an online service. As an
example of a situation in which blocking would not be acceptable to a
hosting service provider, the government specifically referred to the
case of a hosting service provider that made several newsgroups
available and was asked to block an entire newsgroup because of
illegal content in a few individual files posted there.' Thus, arguably
German federal law did not mandate that CompuServe, Inc. block the
illegal content in this case. To block entire newsgroups because of a
few files violating German criminal law would have impacted a high
number of legal communications and impaired CompuServe's
business. Blocking was therefore not reasonably acceptable to
23. See Appeal Case, supra note 2, at 31 (overruling the opinion of the lower
court on this point).
24. See BT-Drs 13/7385, 20.
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CompuServe, Inc. However, given the extremely negative effects of
child pornography and the relatively minor expenses for blocking,
one might also come to the contrary conclusion with regard to this
case and CompuServe, Inc.
c. Liability of Internet Access Providers
Under the 1997 German Internet laws, an Internet access
provider (such as CompuServe Deutschland GmbH in this scenario)"
is generally not liable for the contents to which it provides access.
However, an Internet access provider can be ordered by a court or a
government agency to prevent the distribution of certain contents to
users if (1) it is possible and commercially reasonable to do so, and
(2) if the agency is unable to directly sanction either the responsible
content provider or hosting service provider (because, e.g., they live
abroad).
It is questionable whether, under these rules, an Internet access
provider could be exempt from liability even if it has knowledge of
the illegal content it has made available. The legislature answered
this question in the affirmative. Otherwise, the differentiation
between Internet access providers and hosting service providers
would have been unnecessary.' Accordingly, CompuServe
Deutschland GmbH and its director, Mr. Somm, were exempt from
criminal liability, even though they had knowledge of the illegal
postings.' This was the conclusion of the Munich court of appeals,
which based its acquittal of Mr. Somm also on the 1997 German
Internet laws.3'
I. Outlook-New EC Laws on Online Provider Liability
In the first three years since the 1997 privileges for online
providers have been in effect in Germany, police and district
attorneys seemed to have backed off from prosecuting Internet access
providers and Internet hosting service providers. German civil law
courts have either applied the new rules very reluctantly or
28. See Appeal Case, supra note 2, at 31.
29. See Thomas Hoeren, Anmerkung [Case Note], 1998 M.M.R. 97-98 (1998).
30. See the German Federal Attorney General's formal reasons for terminating
criminal proceedings against an access provider in the decision, November 26, 1997, 2
BjS104/96-4, 1998 MMR 93-98 (1998). This view is heavily criticized by Thomas
Hoeren. See Hoeren, supra note 30.
31. Appeal Case, supra note 2, at 31.
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overlooked them altogether." The Munich court of appeals in Mr.
Somm's case also expressed little respect for the new rules and the
underlying legislative intent.3 Nevertheless, the German statutory
privileges for Internet access providers and hosting service providers
are likely to remain applicable in the foreseeable future because they
are in compliance with the European law, which is about to come into
effect.
The European Community (EC) 4 has recently adopted a final
version of a Directive on "certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market,"35
commonly referred to as the "E-Commerce Directive."36 Once the
EC has formally enacted the E-Commerce Directive, the EC Member
States, including Germany, must conform their national laws to the
rules of the directive within eighteen months, i.e., probably before the
end of the year 2001.
Section 4 of the E-Commerce Directive is entitled "Liability of
Intermediary Service Providers" and contains rules that would apply
in situations like the case against Mr. Somm:
Article 12 "Mere conduit"
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of
the transmission in a communication network of information
32. See, e.g., OLG Mlinchen, CR 18 (1998), 300; OLGZ Mtinchen, K&R 2
(1999), 335; LG Hamburg, ZUM-RD 18 (1998), 389; LG Potsdam, K&R 2 (1999),
428 (429); LG Frankfurt, CR 19 (1999), 45 (46) (with case note by Kloos, CR 1999 at
46). See Lothar Determann, Abgrenzung gesetzlicher Medienkategorien im Internet -
IuKDG-Bericht der Bundesregierung und Probleme der Praxis [Differentiation
Between Legal Media Categories on the Internet-IuKDG Report of the Federal
Government and Practical Problems], Rtkom, 52 (2000), 11.
33. Appeal Case, supra note 2, at 30-31.
34. While the European Union (EU) provides a common "roof' for the different
forms of cooperation of its Member States, it is still the EC that passes the relevant
laws and undertakes nearly all other relevant legal actions.
35. 2000 O.J. (C128) 32.
36. See generally LOTHAR DETERmANN & CHRISTOPH RlrIT'VEGER, EC
ELEcrRONIc BusiNEss LAWs (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the authors);
Gerald Spindler, Verantwortlichkeit von Diensteanbietern nach dem Vorschlag einer
E-Commerce Richtline [Liability of Service Providers Under the Proposed E-
Commerce Directive], 1999 M.M.R 199 (1999); Hubertus Gersdorf, E-Commerce und
Rundfunk [E-Commerce and Broadcasting], 1999 RTkom 75 (1999); Thomas Hoeren,
Vorschlag ffir eine EU-Richtline tiber E-Commerce [The Proposed E-Commerce
Directive], 1999 M.M.R. 192 (1999); Hans-Georg Landfermann, Der
Richtlinienvorschlag Elektronischer Geschiiftsverkehr- Ziele und Probleme [The
Proposed E-Commerce Directive-Goals and Problems], 1999 Z.U.M. 795 (1999).
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provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a
communication network, Member States shall ensure that the
service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on
condition that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the
transmission.
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in
paragraph 1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient
storage of the information transmitted in so far as this takes place
for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the
communication network, and provided that the information is not
stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal
systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent
an infringement.
Article 13. 'Caching'
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of
the transmission in a communication network of information
provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure
that the service provider is not liable for the automatic,
intermediate and temporary storage of that information, performed
for the sole purpose of making more efficient the information's
onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon their
request, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not modify the information;
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the
information;
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the
information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by
industry;
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of
technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data
on the use of the information; and
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(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to
the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of
the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission
has been removed from the network, or access to it has been
disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered
such removal or disablement.
2. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal
systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent
an infringement.
Article 14 'Hosting'
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of
the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service,
Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable
for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the
service, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information
is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is
acting under the authority or the control of the provider.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal
systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent
an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States
of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of
access to information.
Article 15 No general obligation to monitor
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on
providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13
and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store,
nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances
indicating illegal activity.
2. Member States may establish obligations for information society
service providers promptly to inform the competent public
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authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to
communicate to the competent authorities, at their request,
information enabling the identification of recipients of their service
with whom they have storage agreements.
Under the E-Commerce Directive, CompuServe, Inc. would
qualify as a hosting service provider (Article 14) and CompuServe
Deutschland GmbH as a provider of "mere conduit" and "caching"
(Articles 12 and 13).
According to Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, neither
CompuServe, Inc., CompuServe Deutschland GmbH, nor Mr. Somm
may be obligated to monitor the content posted by their customers on
CompuServe, Inc.'s servers. Also, they would generally not be liable
for any illegal content posted by their customers until they have
actual knowledge of such illegal postings.
However, Articles 12(3), 13(2), and 14(3) of the E-Commerce
Directive would not preclude German government authorities from
requesting either CompuServe, Inc. or CompuServe Deutschland
GmbH from preventing further dissemination of illegal contents by
blocking access or removing postings. Consequently, under the E-
Commerce Directive, EC Member States could enact national laws
allowing their national attorneys general to demand that a provider of
a "mere conduit" (such as CompuServe Deutschland GmbH in the
case against Mr. Somn) prevent access to servers displaying illegal
content altogether (such as CompuServe, Inc.'s servers in the case
against Mr. Somm). If a provider of a "mere conduit" fails to comply
with a EC Member State's law enforcement official's request, the E-
Commerce Directive would not warrant any privileges with respect to
vicarious liabilities arising under national laws. As a result, as far as
EC law is concerned, under such circumstances-e.g., under the facts
of the case against Mr. Somm-the Internet access provider and its
managers could be punished under national laws if national laws so
provide.
V. Conclusion
The 1997 German Internet laws as applied by the Munich court
of appeals in Mr. Somm's case seem to adequately protect Internet
hosting service providers and Internet access providers from liabilities
for postings of illegal materials by their customers. Under current
German law, companies that only provide access to the Internet, or a
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"mere conduit," are generally not liable for any illegal content on
third parties' servers to which they provide access.
The 2000 E-Commerce Directive of the European Community
does not afford any additional protection in such scenarios. It allows
the EC Member States to enact laws that provide a standard of
protection similar to that of the 1997 German laws, but it also allows
national laws that are less protective of online providers.

